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SupremeCourt
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DONALD

R. SONGER

IN CONTRASTTOthe large and growing literature on Supreme Court
decision-making in cases decided with full opinions, relatively little
has been written about the prior court decisions to grant or deny
review on petitions for certiorari. Such a shortcoming may be due
in part to the difficulty in obtaining the relevant empirical facts
about the process of decision-making which the Supreme Court's
"doctrine of secrecy" produces.
This lack of attention should not, however, be allowed to obscure
the obvious policy significance of these decisions. In the past about
75 percent of all cases that went to oral argument reached the
Supreme Court through petitions for certiorari.' Certiorari decisions are thus a crucial part of the gatekeeping processes by which
the justices determine which issues will be the subjects of Court
output.
The justices on the Supreme Court have done little to aid scholars
who seek to understand the process. Several studies have suggested
that the official court criteria, contained in Rule 19, shed little light
1 Sheldon Goldman and Thomas P. Jahnige, The Federal Courts as a Political
System (2nd ed.; New York: Harper and Row, 1976), 132.

1186

THE JOURNAL

OF POLITICS, VOL.

41, 1979

on the subject.2 In addition, the Court frequently gives no reason
for the denial of certiorari in a particular case and when it does
purport to offer some explanation, the most frequent reasons given
relate to the importance of the case. However, the Court rarely
explains why a given case was considered "important."
An explanation of decisions on certiorari must begin by noting
the large number of decisions which must be made in relatively
short periods of time. One study found that at most each justice
spends an average of 9.5 minutes per paid petition for certiorari
and considerably less time on petitions filed in forma pauperis.3
Such time constraints obviously make detailed consideration of most
petitions impossible.
The recognition of the lack of time justices have to study certiorari
petitions combined with the belief that a substantial number of the
petitions are frivolous led Joseph Tananhaus and associates to offer
an explanation of certiorari decision-making based on cue theory.
They hypothesized that judges used some method of separating
those petitions which required serious attention from those that
were frivolous and that a readily identifiable group of cues exists
to serve this purpose. They suggested that the presence of any
one of these cues will warn the justice that the petition deserves
scrutiny, while if no cues are present a justice can safely discard
the petition without further expenditure of time and energy.4
They hypothesized that petitions with no cues would be denied
and those containing one or more cues would be studied carefully
and between 25 percent and 43 percent of the petitions with cues
would be granted.5 Three cues were found whose presence significantly increased the chances that a petition would be granted.
Of the 1,226 petitions with one or more cues present, 27.5 percent
were granted compared to the rate of 7.1 percent granted for the
1,372 petitions which contained no cues.6 Tanenhaus, et. al., con2 A succinct summary of past studies which demonstrates the inadequacies
of Rule 19 may be found in Joseph Tanenhaus, Marvin Schick, Matthew Muraskin, and Daniel Rosen, "The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction: Cue
Theory" in Glendon Schubert, ed., Judicial Decision-Making (Glencoe: Free
Press, 1963), 113-115.
3 Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, The Workload of the Supreme
Court (Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1967), 65-66.
4Tanenhaus, et. al., "Cue Theory," 118-120.
5 Ibid., 121.
6Ibid., 126.
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cluded that of the three cues, the most important was the presence
of the national government as the party seeking review.7
A subsequent study by S. Sidney Ulmer, et. al., confirmed the relative importance of the cue of the federal government as party and
petitioner. In fact, when only cases actually discussed by the
justices in conferences were used, the party cue was the only one
of Tanenhaus' three cues which significantly increased the chances
of certiorari being granted.8
The main factor which seems to be missing in cue theory as explicated by Tanenhaus, et. al., is any attention to the merits or the
policy significance of the decision below in cases in which petitions
for certiorari are filled. The belief that the policy values of judges
influence their decisions in cases decided on the merits and that
judges are concerned about the policy outputs of their courts is not
a new idea to students of judicial behavior.9 In fact, as a recent
textbook on the courts puts it, the "central hunch" of behavioral
scholars since Pritchett is that, ". . attitudes and values guide
voting behavior and that the votes in specific cases-what the
authorities actually do-are more important in revealing their attitudes and values than are the rationalizations they provide in their
written opinions."'1O
Since justices appear to recognize the policy significance of their
certiorari decisions, it would be reasonable to expect them to take
the policy consequences of their actions into account when deciding
whether or not to grant certiorari. Lawrence Baum suggests that
although judges might pursue policy goals through any of several
strategies, the most common method is likely to be an "error-correcting" strategy, That is, policy motivated judges would vote to
grant certiorari whenever a lower court decision departed significantly from their preferred doctrinal position.1' Data from the
California Supreme Courts seemed to be consistent with such a

127.
S. Sidney Ulmer, William Hintze, Louise Kirklosky,"The Decision to Grant

7Ibid.,
8

or Deny Certiorari: Further Consideration of Cue Theory," Law and Society
Review, 6 (May, 1972), 640.
9 The best known example of such an approach is probably Glendon Schubert, judicial Policy-Making (Glenview, Ill.: Scott, Foresman, 1965).
10 Goldman and Jahnige, Federal Courts, 159-160.
11Lawrence Baum, "Policy Goals in Judicial Gatekeeping: A Proximity
Model of DiscretionaryJurisdiction,"American Journal of Political Science, 21
(1977), 14.
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strategy.'2 Using votes on certiorari in the Supreme Court recorded
by Justice Burton, Ulmer found a congruence between the votes of
justices on certiorari and their votes on cases decided on the merits
which is consistent with Baum's theory of an "error-correcting
strategy.'3 In a subsequent paper using the same date, Ulmer found
that two liberal justices were more inclined to vote to grant certiorari when the petitioners had low status while two conservative
justices were more prone to grant review to high state petitioners.'4
Glendon Schubert's study of injured worker cases also led him to the
conclusion that the justices were concerned with the policy consequences of the decision below when reviewing certiorari petitions.
He maintained that the most reasonable explanation for his finding
of a much higher rate of granting petitions from the workers than
from their employers was the favortism of the Court for the claims
of one class of litigants.'5
If the scholars cited above are correct in their belief that judges
are concerned about the policy consequences of their certiorari decisions, then cue theory leads to the expectation that the judges will
search for some readily available cues which will enable them
quickly to evaluate certiorari petitions from a policy perspective.
To be adequate as such a cue the factor relied on must enable a
judge to make a quick tentative judgment about whether the case
below was decided "correctly" (that is, in conformity with the
judge's own policy preferences) or whether the decision was in
"error." If this cue indicated to the judge that the decision below.
was in error, it could be taken as an indicator that the petition deserved more careful scrutiny, while if the cue indicated that the
decision below was correct from his policy perspective and if no
other cues were present, then the justice could safely discard the
petition without further expenditure of time and energy.
For many cases, judges could make such tentative judgments
about the "correctness" of the decision below by simply following
the strategy used by many scholars to code decisions as "liberal" or
Ibid., 23-29.
S. Sidney Ulmer, "The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to
Decision 'On the Merits',"Polity, 4 (summer 1972), 429-447.
14 S. Sidney Ulmer, "Underdogs and Upperdogs:
Litigant Status as a
Factor in the Selection of Cases for Supreme Court Review" (paper presented
at the 1976 meeting of the Southern Political Science Association, Atlanta,
Georgia, November 4-6, 1976), 18-21.
15 Glendon Schubert, "Policy Without Law: An Extension of the Certiorari
Game," Stanford Law Review, 14 (1962), 292.
12
13
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"conservative" in their research on judicial behavior. Such a coding
technique usually relies on the nature of the winning and losing
party in the case. The experience of the present author is that for
many cases the decision can be classified as being either liberal or
conservative with an examination of approximately one minute.
This time expenditure is certainly consistent with the requirement
of cue theory that the cue be "readily identifiable."
To test the hypothesis that such policy cues were being used by
justices, all petitions for certiorari listed in U.S. Law Week for four
years which dealt with economic policy were examined. It was
expected that judges who were economic liberals would consider
the policy cue to be present (i.e., they viewed the decision below
to be incorrect from a policy perspective) if the losing party in the
court below was a union or employee in a labor relations case; the
national or state government in a case involving government regulation of the economy; the government in a corporate tax case or in
an individual tax case involving estate tax, gift tax, or income on
capital gains; or an injured worker in a suit to receive compensation
for the injury. For an economic conservative, the policy cue was
considered to be present if the court below supported the claims
of the parties listed above (that is, the court below made a liberal
decision) .
Since the votes of individual justices on certiorari are not available except for the time period studied by Ulmer, time periods had
to be found in which courts could be classified as relatively liberal
or conservative on economic policy.16 There have been two periods
in this century in which the ideological make-up of the Court has
been significantly altered within five years by a single president who
was both determined to change the Court and who was fortunate
enough to be able to make four or five appointments within that
period. These two periods were Franklin Roosevelt's second term
(1937-40) and Richard Nixon's first term (1969-72).
The four years chosen for analysis were the years immediately
before and after each of these two presidents had succeeded in reshaping the Court majority: 1935, 1941, 1967, 1972. The Court in
1935 and 1972 was classified as conservative on economic policy,
16 For analysis of this data from Justice Burton's papers, see Ulmer, "Underdogs and Upperdogs"; Ulmer, "Decision to Grant Certiorari";Ulmer, et. al.,
"FurtherConsiderationsof Cue Theory";and S. Sidney Ulmer, "SupremeCourt
Justices as Strict and Not So Strict Constructionists: Some Implications,"
Law and Society Review, 8 (Fall 1973), 13-32.
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TABLE1
EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS
TO GRANT CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC CASES:

1935, 1941, 1967, 1972 COMBINED

Policy Cue

Certiorari Granted

Certiorari Denied

Present
Absent

114
41

184
294

N=633, x2=57.43,

phi =.091, p<.OOl

Percentage of CertiorariPetitions Granted
Cue Present=38.3%
Cue Absent =12.2%

and in 1941 and 1967 was classified as liberal.'7 For the two liberal
courts, the policy cue was considered to be present if the decision
in the court below was conservative. For the two conservative
courts, the policy cue was considered present if the decision below
was liberal.
The data used to test the proposition that policy cues were used
by the justices in their screening of certiorari petitions is presented
in Table 1. The data reveal that when the court below made a
decision which the Supreme Court majority presumably would
evaluate as in error from a policy perspective after a quick tentative
evaluation, certiorari was granted 38.3 percent of the time. This
figure is well within the theoretical expectations of Tanenhaus,
et. al.'8 On the other hand, when the policy cue was not present,
17 The change in the economic policy of the court from 1935 to 1941 is too
well documented to require further explanation. For the classic work on the
change, see C. Herman Pritchett, The Roosevelt Court: A Study in Judicial
Politics and Values 1937-1947 (New York: Macmillan, 1948). The author's
own tabulation, reported below, of the liberal and conservative decisions of the
Supreme Court in economic cases decided with full opinions (all decisions with
dissent and all unanimous reversals) in 1967 and 1972 supports the popular
perception of the 1972 Burger Court as being more conservative than the 1967
Warren Court.
liberal
conservative
decisions
decisions

1972
1967
18

11
20

N,=41, x2=6.15,
Tanenhaus, et. al., "Cue Theory,' 121.

8
2

p<.02
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TABLE 2
EFFECr

OF THE PRESENCE

OF THE GOVERNMENT

TO GRANT

CERTIORARI

AS PARTY

IN ECONOMIC

CUE FOR DECISIONS

CASES:

1935, 1941, 1967, 1972 COMBINED
Policy Cue

Certiorari Granted

Certiorari Denied

Present
Absent

64
91

35
443

N =633, x2= 102.42,phi=.161, p<.001
Percentage of Certiorari Petitions Granted
Cue Present= 64.6%
Cue Absent = 17.0%

certiorari was granted only 12.2 percent of the time. Since these
differences are statistically significant at the .001 level of confidence,
the hypothesis that policy cues are used by the justices initially
appears to be confirmed.
However, the possibility that the relationship demonstrated above
was caused by the presence of some other cues must be explored.
Tanenhaus, et. al., found that the party cue (the federal government seeking review) had the greatest effect on the decision to
grant certiorari. Table 2 demonstrates that the presence of the
party cue was also strongly related to the decision to grant certiorari
in the four Court terms included in this analysis. Therefore the
party cue was chosen as the appropriate control variable for the
relationship displayed in Table 1.19
Table 3 presents the relationship between presence of the policy
cue and the decision to grant or deny certiorari controlled by the
presence or absence of the party cue. It may be seen that the
presence of the policy cue is statistically significantly related to the
tendency to grant certiorari at the .001 level of confidence for both
those cases in which the party cue is present and those in which
the party cue is absent. These results support the initial hypothesis
that policy cues are in fact used by the justices.
Party and policy cues appear to have a reinforcing effect. When
neither cue is present, the percentage of cases in which certiorari is
19of the other cues used by Tanenhaus, et. al., only the dissension cue is
possibly present in the data used in this analysis. However, this cue was
found to have much less effect on certiorarithan either of the other cues.
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3

EFFECT OF THE PRESENCE OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS TO GRANT
CERTIORARI IN ECONOMIC CASES WHEN CONTROLLED
FOR THE PRESENCE

(A)

OF THE PARTY

CUE

Party Cue Present
Certiorari Granted
Policy Cue

Certiorari Denied

12
52

Absent
Present

27
8

N=99, x2=32.24,

p<.001

phi=.326,

Percentage of CertiorariPetitions Granted
Policy Cue Present=86.7%
Policy Cue Absent =30.8%
(B)

Party Cue Absent
Policy Cue
Absent
Present

Certiorari Granted

Certiorari Denied

29
62

267
176

N = 534,

x2=

24.55, phi =.046,

p<.001

Percentage of CertiorariPetitions Granted
Policy Cue Present= 26.1%
Policy Cue Absent = 9.8%

grantedfalls to 9.8 percent while, when both are present,it soarsto
the astoundingacceptance rate of 86.7 percent. When only one of
the cues is present the rate for granting certiorariassumed intermediate values.
One additional possibility remains to be explored. Since by
definition all economic cases in which the national government
seeks review (that is, those in which the party cues are present)
are conservativedecisions of the courtsbelow, the relative strength
of the party and policy cues may be affectedby a differentialtendency of the Court in all time periods to grant review to liberal and
conservativedecisionsbelow.
To control for this possibility, the analysis of Table 3 was repeated with the sample of cases restricted to those in which the
courts below made a conservative decision. The results are displayed in Table 4.
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TABLE 4

EFFECT OF THE POLICY CUE FOR DECISIONS TO GRANT CERTIORARIIN ECONOMIC
CASES IN PETITIONS FROM CONSERVATIVE DECISIONS OF THE COURTS BELOWCONTROLLED FOR THE PRESENCE OF THE PARTY CUE

(A)

Party Cue Present
Certiorari Granted
Policy Cue
Absent
Present

Certiorari Denied

12
52
N=99,

27
8
x2=32.24,

phi=.326,

p<.001

Percentage of CertiorariPetitions Granted
Policy Cue Present=86.7%
Policy Cue Absent =30.8%
(B)

Party Cue Absent
Certiorari Granted
Policy Cue
Absent
Present

Certiorari Denied

2
23

42

13

N = 80, x2=32.66, phi=.408, p<.001
Percentage of CertiorariPetitions Granted
Policy Cue Present=63.9%
Policy Cue Absent = 4.5%

When only conservative decisions of the courts below are considered, the relationship between the presence of the policy cue and
the decision to grant certiorari is very strong. When both the
policy cue and the party cue are present, certiorari was granted in
86.7 percent of the cases. Perhaps more surprising, when the party
cue is absent but the policy cue present, certiorari was still granted
in 63.9 percent of the cases (compared to only 30.8 percent of the
cases in which only the party cue was present). When neither cue
was present, the success rate for the petitioners dropped to 4.5 percent.
The data presented above appear to be consistent with the cue
theory of Supreme Court decision-making on certiorari petitions
which was advanced by Tanenhaus and associates. They strongly
suggest that in addition to the cues discovered by Tanenhaus, et. al.,
policy cues are used by the justices to determine which petitions
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deserve careful scrutiny. In fact the evidence suggests that when
dealing with cases containing economic issues, policy cues are at
least as importantas the most importantof the three cues discovered
by Tanenhaus, et. al. The strength of association between the
presence of the policy cue and the certioraridecision (as measured
by the phi coefficient) when controlledby the presence or absence
of the party cue was greater than the strength of association between the party cue and the certioraridecision when controlledby
the policy cue.20 Although the differencesbetween these measures
of associationare not large, they suggest that at least policy cues
are of comparableimportanceto the party cue.

20The phi value for the relationship between the party cue and the certiorari
decision was .256 when the policy cue was also present and .041 when the
policy cue was absent.

